Twitter Weekly Updates for 2010-03-14
Written by Will McGill on March 14th, 2010- Performed my first web crawl with Nutch… I am feeling more like IST every day! #
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As cited in Jurges (1973):
Ultimately all decisions are made on the basis of judgment. There is no other way; and there never will be. The question is whether these judgments are made in the fog of inadequate data, unclear and undefined issues or whether they can be made on the basis of adequate, reliable information, reliable experience and clear issues. In the end, analysis is but an aid to judgment – judgment is supreme. – Katz and Kahn (1966)
References
Jurges, G. F. (1973). “Risk Management Keeps Aircraft Carrier Overhaul Planning on Schedule.” Naval Engineers Journal, October, pp. 13-24.
Katz, D. and Kahn, R. L. (1966). The Social Psychology of Organizations. Wiley.
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Note: Article updated on 17 Jan 2010
In 1981, Kaplan and Garrick published a paper entitled “On the Quantitative Definition of Risk” that defined risk as the set of all ordered triplets comprised of answers to the following triplet of questions (Kaplan and Garrick 1981):
These three questions set the stage for what most risk professionals consider to be the fundamental questions of risk assessment. In recent years, more questions have been suggested, including:
In 1991, Professor Yacov Haimes offered a second set of three questions focused on the practice of risk management (Haimes 1991):
Mr. Bob Ross offered a few more interesting risk questions, including several for establishing the risk context (Ross 2009):
Ross also offered a few more for risk management (labeled risk response or more generally risk treatment):
And a few more on risk management effectiveness:
At a high level, Dr. Tony Cox summarizes all of risk analysis in terms of four high-level questions as follows (Cox 2009):
Seeing how the ultimate goal of studying risk in general is to communicate risk knowledge to people that can then use it to make better (i.e., risk informed or risk supported) decisions. Risk communication, then, must consider the following lower-level questions that would help analysts decide on what to say about risk (Morgan et al. 2002; Apgar 2006):
Mr. Bob Ross offered the following additional questions for risk communication:
Of course, there is always the risk that a communication goes south, thus we should also entertain the questions:
If you look carefully at these questions, you might find some overlap among them and also find that they may be interpreted in different ways by different people. In fact, we could consolidate all of these questions into a triplet of risk analysis triplets. These are summarized as follows. Given a clearly and precisely specified situational context (e.g., security context), risk analysis centers on the following nine broad questions:
Risk Assessment Triplet
Risk Communication Triplet
Risk Negotiation Triplet*
Risk management revisits this triplet of triplets over and over again in perpetuity. With time, we learn how well our choices fared through continuous analysis and reanalysis of our systems and their environments. With every action we take, the systems we protect respond with new or modified risks with updated probabilities and severities, and new options and considerations emerge while others become infeasible or irrelevant. And of course, with time and change comes new uncertainties and misunderstandings, both of which require the dedicated attention of risk professionals to study and resolve.
References
Apgar, D. (2006). Risk Intelligence: How to Manage What You Don’t Know. Harvard Business School Press (ISBN 1591399548).
Coles-Kemp, L. (2009). “The Effect of Organisational Structure and Culture on Information Security Risk Processes.” Risk Research Symposium (link here).
Cox, L. A. (2009). “Traditional and Current Risk Analysis.” Presented at the MORS 2009 Workshop, April 2009 (link here).
Haimes, Y. Y. (1991). “Total Risk Management.” Risk Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 169-171 (doi link).
Haimes, Y. Y. (2009). “On the Complex Definition of Risk: A Systems-Based Approach.” Risk Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 12, pp. 1647-1654 (doi link).
Kaplan, S. and Garrick, B. J. (1981). “On the Quantitative Definition of Risk.” Risk Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 11-27 (doi link).
Lowder, J. (2008). “The Difference Between Quantitative and Qualitative Risk Analysis and Why it Matters (Part 1).” BlogInfoSec.org (link here).
Morgan, M. G., Fischhoff, B., Bostrom, A. and Atman, C. (2002). Risk Communication: A Mental Models Approach. Cambridge University Press (ISBN 0521002567).
Ross, R. G. (2009). “Total Risk Management Revisited.” Working Paper.
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I typically come across a few excellent quotes that really resonate with what I am presently thinking about whenever I go on a paper reading binge. Here are some interesting ones that I found recently:
Every year (or, perhaps, every day), some new industry or institution discovers that it, too, has a risk problem. It can, if it wishes, repeat the learning process that its predecessors have undergone. Or, it can attempt to short-circuit that process, and start with its product, namely the best available approaches to risk communication. – Baruch Fischhoff (1995)
Contemporary approaches to disaster reduction need to become more concerned with human-to-human relations, such as conflict resolution and consensus building among people, rather than human-to-nature relations. – Katsuya Yamori (2008)
References
Fischhoff, G. (1995). “Risk Perception and Communication Unplugged: Twenty Years of Process.” Risk Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 137-145 (doi link).
Yamori, K. (2008). “Narrative Mode of Thought in Disaster Reduction: A Crossroad for Narrative and Gaming Approaches.” in Sugiman, T., Gergen, K. J., Wagner, W. and Yamada, Y. eds. Meaning in Action: Constructions, Narratives and Representations. Springer, pp. 241-252 (doi link).
(This is the first post containing a Nasrudin tale related to risk…)
Nasrudin was throwing handfulls of crumbs around his house.
‘What are you doing?’ someone asked him.
‘Keeping the tigers away.’
‘But there are no tigers in these parts.’
‘That’s right. Effective, isn’t it?’ (Shah 4)
From a risk management point of view, Nasrudin asserts that because of his actions (i.e., throwing handfulls of crumbs around his house), all risks associated with the presence of tigers has been mitigated. That is, Nasrudin believes that his actions reduced the probability of tiger presence to zero, thus bringing risk to zero. And because no tigers have appeared, Nasrudin suggests that his strategy is “effective.”
Anyone have a good modern analogy to this sillyness?
References
Shah, I. (1983). The Exploits of the Incomparable Mulla Nasrudin.